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TOWARDS A CONSISTENT TEST 
FOR SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY 
REGARDING INFRINGEMENT 
OF COPYRIGHTED ASPECTS 
OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last half century, computer technology has infil-
trated almost every facet of modern life, effecting everything 
from communication 1 to banking.2 Demand for time-saving 
and money-saving computer products has never been greater, 
as evidenced by sales of computer softwareS in excess of $65 bil-
lion in 1989.4 
With this much money at stake, it is no wonder that com-
puter technology developers pursue copyright protection for 
their products and even more zealously pursue recourse from 
infringers on those copyrights in our courts. However, the 
rapid advancement of computer technology seems in some 
1. 21 million American households have cordless phones. See Sanders, Reach Out 
and Tape Someone, TIME, Jan. 1990 at 55; One fourth of American homes have a cord-
less phone. See Cordless Phones: What Price for Freedom, CONSUMER REPORTS, Nov. 1989 
at 680. Growth of cellular phones in the United States by the end of 1989 is project-
ed at 3.2 million phones and subscribers. See Lopez, Phone Fixation: Once High-
Tech Toys, Cellular Telephones are Becoming Staples, Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 1989, at 
1, col. 1. By 1993, there will be an estimated seven million facsimile units in use. See 
Lightweight Options, Detroit Free Press, Dec. 8,1989, at F3, col. 1,4; Of the nation's 
2.5 million facsimile machines, 300,000 are owned by the legal profession. See Courts 
Taking the Lead in Use of Fax Machines, BUSINESS LEADER, Jan.- Feb. 1989 at 18; Fax 
machines were used by the climbers on a 1988 expedition to the summit of Mount 
Everest to send progress reports via a cellular phone. Chicago Tribune, Aug. 12, 
1990, §10 (Magazine), at 36. Soldiers during operation Dessert Shield used fax 
machines to vote in their hometown elections. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 6, 1990, at A4, 
col. 1. 
2. In 1987, there were an estimated 60,000 automated teller machines (ATMs) 
open across the United States. Helldorfer, Fennell, Hirschberg, Daw & Tillotson, 
Banks & Banking, 42 Bus. LAw. 1002 (1987). 
3. The term "software" refers to "system, utility or application programs expressed 
in computer-readable language (permanently stored in read-only memory for ("ROM") 
which cannot be modified by the user)." QUE'S COMPUTER USER'S DICTIONARY 478 (2d 
ed. 1991). 
4. Anthes, U.S. Software Position at Risk; Senate Hears Testimony That Taxes, 
Export Policies Affect U.S. Market Share, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 25, 1991 at 74. The 
U.s. software industry accounted for more than 60% of that figure, or approximate-
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instances to have outpaced the courts' ability to consistently 
apply traditional copyright doctrines, many of which were 
created in the 19th century.6 
One area where this problem has become particularly bla-
tant is the test for substantial similarity under the "copying" 
element of infringement.s Under the traditional "ordinary 
observer" test first enunciated in 1860,' factfinders were asked 
to determine whether similarity existed between two works by 
their impetuous, intuitive reaction - without the use of, and 
often without the need for, expert testimony regarding the 
similarities and differences between the subject matter. 
However, modern factfinders in computer-related cases, faced 
with detailed factual issues and technical evidence that their 
19th century counterparts could not have imagined, may be 
fundamentally unable to understand the evidence being pre-
sented without the aid of expert help. 
Some modern courts presented with technical computer pro-
gram cases have refused to stray from the traditional test 
and have applied the old rule to facts which may have outgrown 
it.B Other courts have modified9 or in some cases abandoned 1o 
the traditional standard, creating and adopting tests that 
appear to be more applicable to the complex, enigmatic com-
puter-related cases being litigated in the courts today. 
This slow evolutionary process of the law has produced a 
conflict in the circuit courts regarding the appropriate test for 
determining whether an allegedly infringing work is so "sub-
stantially similar"l1 to a copyrighted expression of a computer 
program as to be considered infringing. This Note will first dis-
cuss the complex nature of computer technology and the scope 
6. See Note, Copyrighting -Look and Feel-: Manufacturers Technologies IJ. Cams, 
3 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 196 (1991). ·Some new technologies fit" easily into the pre-
existing framework. Immediately upon development, attorneys and courts comfort-
ably place the technology into a familiar category. Rights are certain, transactions 
efficient, and technological progress continues unhindered. Such has not been the case 
with computer software, which, from the first, has resisted neat categorization." [d. 
at 196 (footnote omitted). 
6. For a discussion of the elements of a copyright infringement cause of action, 
see infra Section III and accompanying notes. 
7. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
S. See infra Section IV, subsection A and accompanying notes. 
9. See infra Section IV, subsection B and accompanying notes. 
10. See infra Section IV, subsection C and accompanying notes. 
11. For a discussion of the ·substantial similarity· test for the copying element 
of a copyright infringement cause of action, see infra Section IV and accompanying notes. 
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of copyright protection currently available for computer pro-
grams. Section III will identify the elements of a copyright 
infringement cause of action and highlight the critical role of 
the test for substantial similarity. Section IV will set out the 
current three-way conflict in the circuit courts regarding the 
appropriate test for substantial similarity in computer program 
infringement cases and will examine the origins, underlying 
justifications and practical ramifications of each test. Finally, 
this Note will conclude that where the subject matter of a. 
copyright dispute is particularly complex, such as computer 
programs, an "integrated" approach to the substantial simi-
larity test, where the trier of fact is allowed access to all rel-
evant evidence regardless of origin, is best. 
II. BACKGROUND 
To fully appreciate the technical nature of this area of 
the law and the detailed understanding and analysis required 
of factfinders in this regard, a foundation must be laid con-
cerning how a computer operates and what copyright law 
principles are primarily at issue in computer program copy-
right cases. 
A. THE BASICS OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 
A computer "system"!2 consists of two basic areas of tech-
nology: 1) "hardware," which comprises the physical and 
mechanical components of a computer,!S and 2) "software," 
which is a broad term generally used to describe computer pro-
grams!4 designed to perform a certain task or group oftasks.!6 
A computer programmer writes a program in one of several 
12. "A complete computer installation - including peripherals, such as disk 
drives, a monitor, and a printer - in which all the components are designed to work 
with each other.w QUE'S COMPUTER USER'S DICTIONARY 123 (2d ed. 1991). 
13. "The electronic components, boards, peripherals, and equipment that make 
up a computer system - distinguished from the programs (software) which tell the com-
ponents what to do.w [d. at 252. 
Classic examples of "hardwareW in a computer system would be the display 
screens, keyboards, printers, disk drives (hard or floppy), central processing units, 
microprocessing "chips; modems, "mice" and all the cables and wires connecting 
two of these things or their like. 
14. Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a "computer program" as "a set of 
statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly to bring about a certain 
result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). 
15. In lay terms, the software used in a computer system tells the hardware what 
to do, and the hardware does it. For a more technical definition, see supra note 3. 
3
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"languages"16 which constitute the literal "source code" of a 
given computer program. Source code language can be written, 
read and spoken by highly trained humans, but cannot be 
read directly in this format by computers, which only read 
"object code."17 Although a skilled programmer can write pro-
grams in object code, because of the great difficulty and time 
involved most programmers utilize a "compiler"18 in the com-
puter to translate the source code to computer-readable object 
code. The source code and the object code constitute the "lit-
eral"19 aspects of a computer program. 
While the program coding may seem to the layperson as 
a tremendous undertaking, in reality it 'is only a small part 
of the total process of creating a successful, profitable pro-
gram. 20 Since most computer users are unsophisticated,21 
the majority of a program creator's time, effort and money 
is spent developing a "user friendly"22 interface for the 
16. There are many source code languages from which a programmer can chose, 
such as BASIC, FORTRAN, COBOL, PASCAL and EDL. This Note ignores as irrelevant 
the distinction between "high level" and "assembly" languages. See Note, 96 HARv. L. 
REV. 1723, 1725 (1983). Regardless, both distinctions of codes have been held to be exam-
ples of "source code." See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 
1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). 
Programs written in different source code languages can produce the same output. 
17. "Object code" is a series of binary instructions consisting of seemingly end-
less combinations of"l"'s and "OW's. 
18. "A program that [translates] the statements written in a human-readable pro-
gramming language (source code) and translates the statements into a machine-
readable executable program (object code). QUE'S COMPUTER USER'S DICTIONARY 118 (2d 
ed. 1991). 
19. See infra Section I, subsection B, part 3 and accompanying notes. 
It is generally understood that the literal "code" aspects of a computer program, 
if original, are copyrightable as "literary works" under 17 U.S.C. § 101(a)(1) (1982). 
See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 45 (D. Mass. 
1990); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982). 
20. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d 
Cir. 1986). 
21. See Note, A Thousand Clones: The Scope of Copyright Protection in the "Look 
and Feel- of Computer Programs - Digital Communications Associates, Inc. v. Softklone 
Distributing Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987),63 WASH. L. REV. 195,220 (1988). 
22. "A program designed so that persons who lack extensive computer experience 
or training can use the system without becoming confused or frustrated. A user-friend-
ly program usually includes the following elements: menus are used instead of forcing 
the user to memorize commands; on-screen help is available at the touch of a key; pro-
gram functions are mapped to the keyboard in a logical order and do not contradict estab-
lished conventions; error messages contain an explanation of what went wrong and what 
to do to solve the problem; intermediate and advanced features are hidden from view 
so they do not clutter the screen and confuse those who are learning the program; com-
mands that could erase or destroy data display confirmation messages that warn the user 
of the command's drastic consequences and provide a way to escape without initiating 
the operation; and clear, concise documentation including [sic] tutorials and reference 
information." QUE'S COMPUTER USER'S DICTIONARY 523-24 (2d ed. 1991). 
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program.2S It is no wonder that protection of the "nonliteral":U 
aspects of a computer program, such as visual display screen 
output,26 has been so adamantly pursued by product manu-
facturers in the courts. 
B. BASIC COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES AFFECTING THE PROTECTION 
OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 
1. Statutory Protection 
The Constitution provides the basis for modern copyright 
law,26 which has evolved from the limited protection of the 
original Copyright Act of 179027 to the broad protection found 
in the modern Copyright Act.28 At its bottom, copyright law was 
established to strike a balance between two competing and 
equally compelling interests; rewarding ingenuity and inno-
vation with "exclusive Right" protection while at the same 
time not quelling that same ingenuity and innovation with 
overly-broad protection.29 
23. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,1231 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (stating that the 'look and feel' of a computer software product often 
involves much more creativity and is often of greater commercial value than the 
program code that implements the product). 
. 24. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 46 (D. Mass. 
1990) (defining "nonliteral" aspects of computer programs to include the overall 
organization of the program, the structure of the programs command system, and the 
presentation of the information on the screen). See also infra Section II, subsection 
B, part 1 and accompanying notes. 
25. It is generally accepted that output from video display screens, if original, 
is copyrightable as an audiovisual work under 17 U.S.C. § 101(a)(6) (1982). See infra 
note 41 and accompanying text. 
26. The Constitution provides that: "Congress shall have Power to ... promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
27. The Copyright Act of May 31, 1790 only granted protection to "any map, chart, 
book or books already in print," and only for a term of 14 years. See Copyright Act of 
1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). 
28. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). The Copyright Act of 1976 lists, nonexclusively, 
many categories works that qualify for copyright protection modernly, and grants a 
protective term of the life of the author(s) plus 50 years after his or her death. [d. See 
also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 48 (D. Mass. 1990) 
(stating that "listed works under section 102 were not intended to be illustrative and 
limiting and do not necessarily exhaust the scope of works the bill intended to protect"). 
29. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 
n.27 (3d Cir. 1986) (courts must take care to reach a balance between two extremes 
equally prejudicial; the one rewarding innovators for their ingenuity and labour, 
and the other retarding progress and improvements). 
As the Court in Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. 
Mass. 1990) stated: 
5
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2. The Idea / Expression Dichotomy 
The Supreme Court made clear in Baker v. Seldenso that 
copyright protection can only be extended to the expression of 
an idea, and not the idea itself.Sl This axiom was codified in the 
section l02(b) of the current Copyright Act.52 While the lan-
guage of this rule may seem clear and simplistic, its applica-
tion to a given set of facts in often difficult,ss and a "catch-all" 
rule germane to all situations is not practical.:U 
1d. at 52-53. 
Copyright monopolies are not granted for the purpose of 
rewarding authors. Rather, Congress has granted copyright 
monopolies to serve the public welfare by encouraging 
authors (broadly defined) to generate new ideas and dis-
close them to the public, being free to do so in any uniquely 
expressed way they may choose.[Citation omittedl ... The 
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair 
return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim 
is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the 
general public good. [Citation omittedl. 
Due to the overwhelming volume of computer related copyright questions surfacing 
in the later half of this century, Congress in 1974 created the National Commission 
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) to research and evaluate 
the copyright protection of computer programs. The National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final Report 1 (1979). CONTU was created 
to help develop a national policy for "protecting the rights of copyright owners and 
ensuring public access to copyrighted works when they are used in computer or 
machine duplication systems, bearing in mind public and con.sumer interest." 1d. at 
3. The CONTU Final Report led to, among other things, the creation and adoption of 
the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3028 
(1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982». A major contribution of the Computer 
Software Copyright Act of 1980 is that it amended the copyright laws to include a def-
inition of "computer program." See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
30. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
31. 1d. at 102-03. 
It is interesting to note that at least one court has held that "the relationship 
between idea and expression applies to the issue of infringement rather than copy-
rightability." Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., No. C88-20352 RPA (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 6, 1989) (1989 WESTLA W 200350, 2 n.2, Allfeds directory) (citing NEC Corp. 
v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d. 1177, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 1989». 
32. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, princi-
ple, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, 
or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). 
33. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 42 (where 
Judge Keeton akins the practical application of this rule to "Answering [al riddle ... "). 
See also Sid & Marty Kroffi; Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 
1163 n.6 (9th Cir. 1977) (criticizing the ideslexpression distinction, but admitting that 
"no better formulation [balancing the competing interests of copyright law 1 has been 
devised"). 
34. As Judge Learned Hand said aptly in Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner 
Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960), "The test for infringement of a copyright is of 
necessity vague .... Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has 
gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must there-
fore inevitably be ad hoc." 1d. at 489 (emphasis in original). 
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3. Protection of Literal and Non-Literal Aspects of Computer 
Programs 
While the law almost uniformly extends copyright protec-
tion to the "literal"36 or code aspects of computer programs/e 
The courts have extended the idea/expression dichotomy to form three interrelated 
factually-based doctrines. The first, known as the "merger doctrine," applies where a 
single idea can only be expressed in a very limited number of ways. There it is said that 
the expression "merges" with the idea and is therefore not granted protection under copy-
right laws. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 
1971) (the classic case where idea of jewel -encrusted "bee" stick pin was found to be indis-
tinguishable from the expression of that idea). See also Broderbund Software, Inc. v. 
Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (iran idea is indistin-
guishable from its expression, the idea is "merged" into the expression and the expres-
sion cannot be protected under the copyright laws). See also Digital Comms. Assocs. 
v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 458 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (The "accepted test" 
for merger in the computer area is: if there is only one way to express the idea, 'idea' 
and 'expression' merge and there is no copyrightable material). 
The second related doctrine is the ~lank form" doctrine. Blank forms that do not 
convey information are not copyrightable. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 
(1879). However, if a blank form by its arrangement and organization conveys some 
information, Digital Comms. ABsocs. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 461 
(N.D. Ga 1987), or is sufficiently innovative that the arrangement of information is 
itself informative, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 
1250 (3d Cir. 1983), cert dismissed, 464 U.S. 1003, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984), then it is an 
expression to be protected by the copyright laws. "The litmus seems to be whether the 
material proffered for copyright undertakes to express." Synercom Tech., Inc. v. 
University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1011 (N.D. Tex. 1978). 
The third doctrine is the prohibition from copyright protection of utilitarian or "func-
tional" aspects of works. Utilitarian aspects of copyrighted works are those aspects which 
do not undertake to express, but rather are designed solely for their use. Copyright pro-
tection extends only to the artistic aspects, and not the mechanical or utilitarian fea-
tures, ofa protected work. Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 
1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986). Since the purpose of a utilitarian work is the work's idea, 
everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function is part of the expression of 
the idea. Lotus Dev. Corp: v. Paperback SoftwareInt'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 52 (D. Mass. 
1990). If the expressive element of an object cannot be separated from its utility, it is 
not a copyrightable aspect of that object. See Fabrica, Inc. v. EI Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 
890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1987) (since no expressive element of display folders could exist 
independently of the utility of the folders themselves, no protection was allowed). 
Conversely, expressive aspects of utilitarian works may be copyrighted. See also Apple 
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1251-52 (3d air. 1983), cert. 
dismissed, 464 U.S. 1003, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984) (computer operating systems, though 
designed for their mechanical utilitarian use, are not wholly unilateral and qualify for 
protection as expressive). 
This doctrine is codified in Section 101 of the present Copyright Act. See 17 
U.S.C. §101 (1982). 
35. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
36. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 
1990) ("[A]s a general proposition, [the] literal manifestations of a computer program 
- including both source code and object code - if original, are copyrightable"); Stern 
Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Written comput-
er programs are copyrightable as literary works."); Whelan ABsocs. v. Jaslow Dental 
Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3d Cir. 1986) ("It is well, though recently, estab-
lished that copyright protection extends to a program's source and object codes."). 
7
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there confusion remains as to whether and what "nonliteral"37 
aspects of programs qualify for copyright protection, and 
whether that protection exists separate from the underlying 
program. 58 
Two major theories of protection exist regarding nonliter-
al aspects of computer programs:89 1) the nonliteral aspects are 
integral elements of the computer program and are therefore 
protected by registering the underlying literal codes ("copyright 
extension theory"), and 2) the nonliteral aspects are separate 
original works and expressions and therefore qualify for inde-
pendent protection regardless of the underlying codes ("inde-
pendent copyright theory") . .o Courts have often blurred, bent 
and overlapped these two theories to fit a given situation. 
While generally accepting the independent copyright theory,41 
37. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
38. This is an area where much of the litigation concerning computer technolo-
gy has been had. While not the focus of this Note, due to the amount of litigation, com-
mentary and the complexity in this area, a brief discussion is necessary. 
39. Prior to 1988, the Copyright Office allowed separate copyright registration 
of "literary- code and the visual display screens generated by that code. However, in 
1988 the Copyright Office announced that it would only accept a single registration 
per separate program, and that the registration would protect all aspects of the pro-
gram because "computer program code and screen displays are integrally related and 
ordinarily form a single work: Copyright Office, Notice of Registration Decision: 
Registration and Deposit of Computer Screen Displays, 53 Fed. Reg. 21,817-19 (1988). 
This formal policy stance of the Copyright Office, while a novel attempt to relieve some 
of the confusion in this area, seems to have had little impact on the actual analysis 
in the courts, for as shown, see infra note 4 and accompanying text, the decisions on 
this issue both pre- and post-1988 have been inconsistent. See also Manufacturers 
Tech., Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F.Supp. 984,990-91 (D. Conn. 1989) ("[This] recent deci-
sion of the Copyright Office ... [is] simply a reaffirmation of its long-standing policy, 
... [addressing] that confusion may have arisen from its [previous] concurrent accep-
tance of separate registrations of screen displays'-). 
40. The rational behind "separate screen- copyrighting is that many different com-
puter programs can produce the same resulting display screen output. Stern Elecs., 
Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982). 
41. The majority of cases addressing this theory have concerned videogame 
audiovisual displays, and all have generally held that the nonliteral aspects of video 
and audio displays are protected separately from the underlying literal computer 
program code as original audiovisual works under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). See Stern 
Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 853-57 (2d Cir. 1982) (video game, defined as 
a computer programmed to create on a television screen images that can in some 
respect be controlled by the user, is copyrightable as audiovisual works); Atari, Inc. 
v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 226 (D. Md. 1981) (visual presentation 
of the game "Asteroids- is the plaintiffs work, and is copyrightable as an audiovisual 
work); M. Kramer Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 435-36 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(copyrightability of video games as audiovisual works cannot be disputed); Midway Mfg. 
Co. v. Bandai-Am., Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 139 (D. N.J. 1982) (unquestionable that video 
games in general are entitled to copyright protection as audiovisual works); Atari, Inc. 
v. North Am. Phillips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982) (the game, the idea of the gaine, itself is not protected 
8
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OpInIOnS analyzing the viability of the copyright extension 
theory have been very narrow and have often been in express 
conflict with each other. 42 
It has recently been urged that the "total concept, look 
and feel"43 of a computer program's user interface should be a 
copyrightable nonliteral feature of a computer program.44 This 
new theory of protection has been the subject of much com-
but the shape and characteristics of the display and the shapes, sizes, colors, 
sequences, arrangements and sounds that provide something new or additional over 
the idea are protected). 
The fact that many programs can produce the same resulting output suggests basic 
problems with even the Copyright Act definition ·of"computer program" itself. See supra 
note 14 and accompanying text. 
42. See Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 
1013-14 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (rejecting the copyright extension theory to the "sequence 
and ordering of data" on the screen); Digital Comms. Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 
659 F. Supp. 449, 455-56 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (expressly rejecting Broderbund and holding 
that the copyright protection of a computer program does not extend to screen displays 
generated by the program). Cf. SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 
816, 829-30 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (holding that the organization and structural details 
of a computer program designed to perform statistical analysis were expression of the 
program's idea, and were therefore protected); Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental 
Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1237-40 (3d Cir. 1986) (expressly declining to follow 
the unsound reasoning of Synercom and adopting the SAS Inst. line of logic); 
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127,1134 (N.D. Cal. 
1986) (expressly extending Whelan and holding that the structure, sequence and 
layout of the audiovisual display of the computer program were expressions of artistic 
and aesthetic elements, and were therefore protected by the underlying copyrighted 
program code); Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., No. C88-20352 RPA 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 1989) (1989 WESTLAW 200350, 2-3, Allfeds directory) (expressly 
extending Whelan and Broderbund and holding that "[cJopyright protection applies 
to the user interface, or overall structure and organization of a computer program, 
including its audiovisual displays, or screen 'look andree}'"); Johnson Controls, Inc. 
v. Phoenix Control Sys., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989) (avoiding expressly 
addressing the conflict emerging on this issue, the Court by implication extended the 
copyright extension theory); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 
37, 80-82 (D.Mass. 1990) (after pointing out the conflict between case law, Copyright 
Office registration procedure and current copyright statutes, the Court implicitly 
followed the Whelan line and held that the protection offered by registering the 
underlying literal code extends to all nonliteral elements of expression contained in 
that program). Cf. Manufacturers Tech., Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 990-93 
(D.Conn. 1989). After identifying and discussing the deficiencies of the two existing 
"schools of thought; the Court ultimately created and adopted a new "legal fiction" 
by which it could extend the holding of Softklone: "[TJreat the single registration of 
the computer program as accomplishing two interrelated yet distinct registrations; one 
of the program itself and one of the screen displays or user interface of that program, 
to the extent that each contains copyrightable subject matter .... This approach con-
forms with the realities of Copyright Office registration procedures." Id. at 993. 
43. "Look and feel" describes the manner in which the computer program inter-
acts with the. user, i.e., how its use is facilitated by the environment created by the 
computer program. 
44. Protection of this feature has been argued to attach under either the "copy-
right extension" or the "independent copyright" theory. 
9
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mentary46 and a few courts have addressed it in the context of 
computer display outputs.46 However, this theory is often ~on­
fused with a test for "substantial similarity" under the "copy-
ing" element of infringement that bears the same name.47 At 
least one court has taken steps to alleviate this confusion by 
expressly rejecting the theory that a computer program's "look 
and feel" is covered by copyright law.46 
45. Moreno, -Look and FeeZ- as a Copyrightable Element, 51 LA. L. REV. 177, 182-
86 (1990) (suggesting that "look and feel" concept has been applied both as a theory 
of copyrightablity and as a test of substantial similarity, and that the burden of 
proof on the issue of infringement should be shifted to the defendant); Comment, 
Protectintl the "Look and Feel" of Computer Software, 1 HIGH TECH. L.J. 411, 445 (1986) 
(suggesting that the courts should dissect the "look and feel" of computer software into 
its component parts and identify which elements deserve copyright protection); Note, 
Protectintl the Look and Feel of Computer Programs, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 561, 591 (1988) 
(concluding the relationship between the underlying written code used to create a pro-
gram and a program's resulting operation has proven too complex for current copy-
right laws). 
46. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int1, 740 F. Supp. 37, 63 (D. Mass. 
1990) (rejecting a program's "look and feel" as a separately copyrightable expression); 
Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., No. C88-20352 RPA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 
1989) (1989 WESTLA W 200350, 2-3, Allfeds directory) (court finds that no reasonable 
jury would fmd the opening display screens of two works had substantially similar "look 
and feel"); Broderbund Software, Inc. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1137 (N.D. 
Cal. 1986) (the -total concept and feel" of two computer programs was found to be "vir-
tually identical"). 
47. The notion of "look and feel" as a test for substantial similarity first arose in 
cases involving very visual literary works such as greeting cards, see Roth Greeting 
Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970) (coining the phrase "total 
concept and feel" concerning two similar cards). 
In addition to its use in computer program cases, the "look and feel" concept has 
been extended to cover similarities between music, see Black v. Gosdin, 740 F. Supp. 
1288, 1292-94 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (two country music songs about broken-hearted lovers 
did not have the same "total concept and feel"), literary plots, themes and characters, 
see Burgess v. Chase-Riboud, 765 F. Supp. 223, 239-43 (E.D. Penn. 1991) (plaintiffs 
play about Thomas Jefferson's alleged love affair with a slave had the same "look and 
feel" as defendant's novel); Branch v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 819, 823 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (two cookbooks had the same "total feel and concept"), television 
characters, see Sid & Marty Krom Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 
1157, 1167 (9th Cir, 1977) (McDonald's restaurant commercial captured the "total 
concept and feel" of plaintifi's Pufnstuf television show), and other visually distinc-
tive objects, see Pasillas v. McDonald's Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442-43 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(McDonald's "man in the moon" mask used in television commercial, while admittedly 
. sharing the same idea, did not have the "total concept and feel" as the plaintifi's copy-
righted Halloween mask). 
For discussion of "total concept, look and feel" as a test for substantial similar-
. ity under the copying element of an infringement cause of action, see infra section III 
and accompanying notes. 
48. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 62-63 
(D.Mass. 1990) (where the court stated that total concept, look and feel concept is not 
used to determine copyrightablity, but rather assuming copyrightability, it is used in 
applying the substantial similarity test to determine whether forbidden copying has 
occurred). "'Look and feel' is a conclusion, not a test." rd. 
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III. THE ELEMENTS OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
In order to maintain an infringement claim, the plaintiff 
must prove valid ownership of a copyright49 and "copying" of 
the protected material by the defendant. 50 Since direct evi-
dence of copying is rarely available,51 it must often be proven 
inferentially by showing that the defendant had access52 to the 
allegedly infringed copyrighted work and that the allegedly 
infringing work is "substantially similar."63 Summary judgment 
49. In order to establish ownership of a copyright, the plaintiff must establish (1) 
originality in the author of the copyrighted work; (2) copyrightablility of the subject mat-
ter of the work; (3) proper citizenship of the author; (4) compliance with the applicable 
statutory formalities; and (5) (if the plaintift'is not the author) a transfer of rights or other 
relationship between the author and the plaintiff so as to constitute the plaintiff as a 
valid copyright claimant. Digital Comms. AsS0C8. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 
449, 453 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (citing NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.0l[A] (1986». 
Registration ofa copyright constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of the 
copyright works covered thereby, and shifts to the defendant the burden of producing 
evidence showing that the registered works are not copyrightable. Manufacturers 
Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984,991 (D. Conn. 1989) (citing M. 
NIMMER & D. NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§12.ll[A], [B] at 12-80.3-12-80.4 
(1988». In most computer- related cases, ownership of a valid copyright by the plain-
tiff is not challenged, unless a dispute exists concerning whether certain aspects of a 
computer program contain copyrightable subject matter. 
50. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444, 1453 (N.D. Cal. 
1991). See also Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, 862 F.2d 294, 206 (9th Cir. 1988); Sid & 
Marty Krom Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d ll57, ll62 (9th Cir. 
1977); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th 
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982). See also NIMMER, 3 THE LAW OF 
COPYRIGHT § 13.01 (1990). 
51. See Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. ll27, ll35 
(N.D. Cal. 1986) (stating that "The present case is exceptional in this regard. Plaintiffs 
produced sufficient direct evidence of copying to establish infringement"); Digital 
Comms. Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 465 (N.D. Ga. 1987) 
("[C]opying is ordinarily impossible to prove by direct evidence ..... ); Apple Computer, 
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444, 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (stating that "[D]irect 
evidence of copying is rare .... "). 
52. "Access" has been defined in very divergent ways, including "actual viewing" 
of the copyrighted work, see Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 287 F.2d 
478,479 (9th Cir. 1961), "opportunity to view," see Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 245 
F. Supp. 451, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd, 360 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1966), ·opportunity to 
copy," see Musto v. Meyer, 434 F. Supp. 32,34 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), "reasonable opportunity 
to copy," see Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries of Canada, Ltd., 452 F. 
Supp. 429, 438 (1978), and a "reasonable possibility" of the opportunity to view." Testa 
v. Janssen, 429 F. Supp. 198,202-03 (W.D. Pa. 1980). 
53. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231-32 (3d 
Cir. 1986). See also Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. ll27, 
ll35 (N.D. Cal. 1986) ("Because direct evidence of copying is rarely available, copying 
may be established by proof of access and substantial similarity.·); Johnson Controls, 
Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., 886 F.2d ll73,1176 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Copying can be shown 
by circumstantial evidence of access to the copyrighted work, and substantial similarity 
between the copyrighted work and the infringer's work"); Apple Computer, Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444, 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1991) ("[C]opying may be established 
by circumstantial evidence of access and substantial similarity of ideas and the expres-
sion between the copyrighted work and the alleged infringing work"). 
11
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on this issue may be granted where the copying is so "over-
whelming and pervasive"M or "striking"56 as to preclude any asser-
tion of independent creation of the allegedly infringing work.56 
Access in most computer program cases is usually undis-
puted.57 Hence, the dispositive issue is often whether aspects 
of the allegedly infringing program are substantially similar 
to those of the copyrighted work.58 Consistent application of a 
uniform test for substantial similarity is crucial to produce· 
The question of substantial similarity is generally a question of fact, and the pira-
cy of even a quantitatively small fragment may be qualitatively substantial. SAS Inst., 
Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816, 829-30 (M.D. Tenn. 1985). 
In addition, "a laundry list of specific differences ... will not preclude the finding 
of infringement where the works are substantially similar in other respects. [Citation 
omitted]." Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 70 (D. 
Mass. 1990). 
54. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 68 (D.Mass. 
1990) (where the court held "the copying in this case is so 'overwhelming and perva-
sive' as to preclude, as a matter oflaw, any assertion of independent creation ... "). See 
also Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-Am., Inc. 546 F. Supp. 124, 141 n.l1, 149 (D.N.J. 1982) 
("overwhelming and pervasive" copying can preclude, as a matter oflaw, finding of in de-
pendent creation, and can support grant for summary judgment). 
Nimmer believes in such a very unusual circumstance, the similarity required 
should "greatly exceed even the striking similarity which would justify a trier of fact 
in inferring copying without proof of access." NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
12.10, at 12, 73, 74 (1986). 
55. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). "If evidence of access is 
absent, the similarities must be so striking as to preclude the possibility that plain-
tiff and defendant independently arrived at the same result." 1d. 
56. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 68 (D.Mass. 
1990). The court concluded that "The works are ... substantially, indeed, strikingly, 
similar." [d. at 70. 
57. See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., 886 F.2d 1173, 1176 (9th 
Cir. 1989) ("Access is clear in this case .... Several employees of Phoenix Control are 
former employees of Johnson, and worked on several version of the [copyrighted 
work]."); Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., No. C88- 20352 RPA (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 6, 1989) (1989 WESTLAW 200350, 2, Allfeds directory) ("In this case, there is 
no dispute over the ... access to PC-Outline."); Manufacturers Techs., Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 
706 F. Supp. 984, 1000 (D.Conn. 1989) ("[Dlefendants had access to COSTIMATOR 
screen displays and it's user's manual."); Digital Comms. Assocs. v, Softklone Distrib. 
Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 465 (N.D. Ga. 1987) ("Here, the defendants acknowledge access 
to the status screen prior to the development of their Mirror program."); Whelan ABsocs. 
v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[H]ere it is 
uncontested, that Rand Jaslow had access to the Dentalab program, both because 
Dentalab was the program used in Jaslow Labs and because Rand Jaslow acted as a 
sales representative for Whelan Associates."). 
It appears that since access is such a loose standard, see supra note 52 and 
accompanying text, it is often easily met. 
58. See Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., No. C88- 20352 RPA (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 6, 1989 (1989 WESTLAW 200350, 2, Allfeds directory) ("The only disput-
ed issue is whether or not there is substantial similarity in the expression of the idea 
ofa computer outlining program."); Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 
797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[T]he sole question is whether there was sub-
stantial similarity between the Dentcom and Dentalab programs. "). 
12
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predictability of outcome in this already complex area of the 
law. Unfortunately, it appears the courts have failed to estab-
lish and apply a uniform test. 
IV. EXISTING TESTS FOR "SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY" 
Several distinct standards currently exist for determin-
ing whether substantial similarity exists between a copy-
righted work and an allegedly infringing work. Early copyright 
cases involved reasonably simple factual determinations, such 
as those involving the alleged infringement of a copyrighted plot 
of a book or the copyrighted score or lyrics of a song.59 In such 
cases, the ordinary lay person could reasonably ascertain 
whether an allegedly infringing work substantially appropri-
ated the copyright holder's protected efforts.60 
However, as technological advances grew by leaps and 
bounds in the later part of this century, so too did the com-
plexity level of trials where new "cutting edge" technologies 
were at hand. The triers of fact were often too inexperienced 
and uneducated to adequately grasp and distinguish the intri-
cate, detailed facts of a complex case.81 As a result, some courts 
began to allow experts to provide enlightening evidence on the 
complicated issues of a given case. The appropriate role and 
weight of this expert testimony has yet to be firmly estab-
lished by the courts, particularly in cases of extraordinary 
complexity where fear that jurors will either ignore or misuse 
this testimony is greatest. 
This has resulted in the concurrent existence of three dis-
tinct and conflicting tests for substantially similarity in the cir-
cuit courts: one completely absent of any expert testimony,62 one 
allowing expert opinion and lay observation to be used in sep-
arate, very departmentalized manners,83 and a third, more 
59. See Burgess v. Chase-Riboud, 765 F. Supp. 223, 239-43 (E.D. Penn. 1991) 
(involving two plays); Branch v. Ogilvy" Mather, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 819, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990) (involving two books); Black v. Gosdin, 740 F. Supp. 1288, 1292-94 (M.D. Tenn. 
1990) (involving two songs). 
60. See infra notes 65 through 74 and accompanying text. 
61. See Note, Copyrighting -Loole and Feel-: Manufacturers Technologies v. 
Cams, 3 HARV. J.L. "TECH. 195,202 (1991) (stating that -the lay observer may not 
be able to determine similarity based solely on [copyrightable] elements. The similarity 
of un copyrightable elements might make the ordinary person perceive the [works] as 
similar. "). 
62. See infra notes 65 through 74 and accompanying text. 
63. See infra notes 75 through 110 and accompanying text. 
13
Smith: Copyright Infringement
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992
444 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:431 
pragmatic approach where the trier of fact has access to all rel-
evant testimony, regardless of origin, on this issue.
84 
A. THE "ORDINARY OBSERVER" TEST 
The first "test" to determine if one work was substantial-
ly similar to another seems to have originated in Daly u. 
Palmer.66 In Daly, a playwright sued for infringement based 
on a scene in the defendant's play which was almost identical 
to that found in .the plaintiff's production. In establishing 
whether the defendant's play was so like the plaintiff's as to 
be considered an infringement, the court stated the issue 
was whether the two works would be "recognized by the spec-
tator, through any of the senses to which the representation 
is addressed, as conveying substantially the same impres-
sions to, and exciting the same emotions in, the mind, in the 
sequence or order. "66 
While this standard is often referred to by many different 
names,67 most courts have labeled this approach the "ordi-
nary observer" test, a label first coined in Harold Lloyd Corp. 
u. Whitwer.68 Regardless of the name, the practical application 
of this test is clear: the trier of fact is to make a "spontaneous 
and immediate"69 evaluation of the two works and, without the 
64. See infra notes 111 through 126 and accompanying text. 
65. 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,552). 
66. Id. at 1138. 
67. Courts and commentators have referred to this standard also as the -audience" 
or -spectator reactions" test, see Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 
672 F.2d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982) (applying 
the -audience" test); Note, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper Role for 
Audience Reactions in Determining Substantial Similarity, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 385,393-
416 (1981) (arguing that a finely-tuned -audience" test, one that evaluates infringe-
ment from the point of view of an artist's economic incentive to create - his audience 
- is the best test for substantial similarity); NIMMER, 3 THE LAw OF COPYRIGHT, 
§13.03[E)[2] (1991) (using the term -audience test"); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 
443,454 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that a "viewing audience" test is preferred to the tra-
ditional -average lay observer" approach). 
Courts have also changed the wording of this test to fit the appropriate subject 
matter of the dispute. Hence, it has also been described as the ·ordinary lay hearer" 
test, see Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946). 
Courts have also used the term -ordinary reasonable person" regarding this 
test. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 7 F. Supp. 837,842 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), 
rev'd on other grounds, 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936). 
For criticism of the -reasonable person" standard as applied in copyright law, see 
infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
68. 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933). The court held that the substantial similarity anal-
ysis must be made from the perspective of the -ordinary observer."ld. at 19. 
69. Id. at 18. 
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aid of expert analysis and detailed dissection,70 decide by 
"spontaneous response"71 whether the expression of the copy-
righted work was appropriated. By ridding from the analysis 
the overwhelming technical material presented by experts,72 
this approach, as Judge Learned Hand put it, rescues the lay 
juror from "the classic difficulty of not being able to see the for-
est for the trees."73 
Since computer-related cases involve by necessity the over-
whelming technical evidence of the type Judge Hand felt must 
be avoided, an unmodified "ordinary observer" test in the tra-
ditional sense seems to be obsolete regarding this subject mat-
ter. This may explain the complete abyss of case law applying 
the traditional test to computer-related technology, particularly 
since the development of the "bifurcated" approach.74 
B. THE "BIFURCATED" TEST 
As intricate, detailed factual issues arose in cases involv-
ing specialized technical expertise, courts found that expert tes-
timony in some form was required to help, if not educate, the 
often perplexed trier of fact in making their determinations. 75 
Rather than abolishing decades of precedent regarding the 
traditional "ordinary observer" test, some jurisdictions added 
a preliminary level of inquiry in which the court, not the trier 
of fact, would evaluate and use this expert evidence. 'lWo dis-
tinct forms of this "two-step" or "bifurcated" test have emerged 
in the circuit courts that when taken together form the second 
conflicting test in this area. On their face, the two approach-
es seem to be different and may even appear inconsistent. 
70. Detailed or "analytical" dissection here means a "side-by- side comparison of 
each element of the copyrighted and allegedly infringing works." Broderbund Software, 
Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 1986). 
71. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 51 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
476 U.S. 1159, 106 S. Ct. 2278 (1986). 
72. Judge Learned Hand was so incensed by the use of experts on this issue that 
he ruled that such evidence would not be heard before him and that he wished "such 
evidence may in the future be entirely excluded." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 
45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930). 
73. Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1918). 
74. See Section IV, subsection B and accompanying notes. 
75. See Note, Copyrighting «Look and Feel": Manufacturers Technologies v. 
Cams, 3 lIARv. J.L. & TECH. 195,202 (1991) (concluding that the traditional "ordinary 
observer" test may fail in complex computer-related cases "since the determination of 
copyrightable elements in a screen display is a technical legal issue, [and] the lay 
observer may not be able to determine similarity based solely on those elements"). "The 
similarity of uncopyrightable elements might make the ordinary person perceive 
the [computer user] interfaces as similar." [d. 
15
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However, upon close examination of the language of these 
tests and their application it becomes apparent that, seman-
tics aside, the same doctrine is being applied. 
1. The Arnstein Doctrine 
Arnstein v. Porter78 first solidly delineated a "two-prong" 
substantial similarity analysis. In that case, the plaintiff 
brought a copyright infringement action alleging the defendant 
infringed the plaintiff's copyrighted musical compositions.77 The 
Arnstein court introduced a separate "essential element to a 
plaintiff's case,",8 not to be confused with "copying."79 This 
element the court referred to as "improper appropriation,"80 
which is distinguished from copying as follows: 
As to the first - copying - ... the trier of fact 
must determine whether the similarities 
are sufficient to prove copying. On this issue, 
analysis ("dissection") is relevant, and the 
testimony of experts may be received to and 
the trier of fact ... 
If copying is established, then and only then 
does there arise the second issue, that of 
illicit copying (unlawful appropriation). On 
that issue ... the test is the response of the 
ordinary lay hearer; accordingly, on that 
issue, "dissection" and expert testimony are 
irrelevant.81 
In the realm of computer technology litigation, the bifur-
cated approach proffered by Arnstein was adopted and very 
aptly explained almost 43 years later in Manufacturers 
Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc. 82 In Manufacturers Technologies, 
76. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 




81. Id. (emphasis added). 
82. 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989). See also Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 
F.2d 44, 51 (2d Cir. 1986). "The relevance, and hence admissibility, of expert analysis on 
this issues depends on the standard for determining substantial similarity. We note that 
some confusion surrounds the standard to be applied. The formula most favored by courts 
... and often expressed in our circuit ... is that substantial similarity should be judged by 
the spontaneous response of the ordinary lay observer. Taken literally, such a standard 
would altogether bar expert analysis and -dissection" of creative works .... However, our 
opinion in Arnstein v. Porter ... indicates that such literalness is not required." Id. 
16
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plaintiff corporation developed and copyrighted a computer-
aided cost estimating program called "COSTIMATOR" designed 
to enable the user to estimate the cost of machining a manu-
factured part by computer rather than manual calculation.8s 
The defendants, after having spent two years as "sales repre-
sentatives" for the plaintifrs COSTIMATOR product line, ter-
minated their sales relationship with the plaintiff corporation 
and began marketing their own copyrighted cost- estimating 
programs.84 Plaintiffs brought suit, alleging that the defendants 
had infringed the COSTIMATOR copyright. 
The court held an infringement had occurred. Noting the 
two-prong test of Arnstein was still competing in the Second 
Circuit with the traditional "ordinary lay observer" test,85the 
Manufacturers Technologies court bluntly rejected the notion that 
the "ordinary observer" test was the sole dispositive considera-
tion. 8S It held that in complex cases, the court may first consid-
er expert testimony relevant to whether there is sufficient 
similarity between non-protected aspects of the tw:o works to 
establish copying.87 "Then, if and only if copying is established, 
the factfinder must determine without the assistance of expert 
testimony whether there are substantial similarities between the 
protected aspects of the plaintifCs work and the allegedly 
infringing work indicating "illicit copying" or infringement."88 
2. The Krofft Approach 
In an effort to extend and clarify the bifurcated analytical pro-
cess established in Arnstein,89 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
handed down the landmark opinion of Sid & Marty Krofft 
The court in SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 
1985) also implicitly followed the "bifurcated" approach, referring to the satisfaction 
of "branch[es]" in its analysis of the substantial similarity test. Id. at 829. 
83. Manufacturers Techs., Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 988 (D. Conn. 
1989). 
84. Id. at 989·90. The product of the defendants' efforts were the programs 
known as "QUICKCOST (QC)" and "RAPIDCOST." In the defendant's own words, they 
planned to market a "K·Mart Cost Estimator rather than a Cadillac [namely COS· 
TIMATOR]." Id. 
85. Id. at 1000 (the court pointed out the conflict between the Arnstein decision 
and that of Walker v. Times Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44,51·52 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S. Ct. 2278 (1986), which held that the Second Circuit stan· 
dard for determining whether works are substantially similar is whether they appear 
so from the "spontaneous response of the ordinary lay observer," without regard to 
expert testimony). 
86. Manufacturers Teehs., Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 1000 (D.Conn. 1989). 
87.Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
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Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.90 Rather than 
adopt the foreign language used by the Second Circuit, the court 
chose to restate the bifurcated test using its own jurisdictional 
dialect, holding that two steps are implied by the requirement 
of substantial similarity; (1) an "extrinsic" test, where analyti-
cal dissection and expert testimony are appropriate to determine 
ifthere are similarity ofideas and where the question can be dis-
posed of as a matter oflaw, and (2) an "intrinsic" test, where the 
expressions of the two works involved should be considered and 
tested, not hypercritically or with meticulous scrutiny, but by the 
observations and impressions of the average reasonable91 read-
er or spectator without external criteria and analysis.92 
The Krofft approach was expressly adopted in two recent 
computer program copyright cases: Digital Communications 
Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp.98 and Broderbund Software, 
Inc. v. Unison World, Inc. 94 In Softklone, an infringement law-
suit was brought by the owner of single copyrighted status 
90. 562 F.2d ll57, ll64-65 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that ·the same type of 
bifurcated test was announced in Arnstein v. Porter .... We believe the court in 
Arnstein was illuding to the idea- expression dichotomy which we make explicit 
today."). 
91. The term -reasonable person" regarding the intrinsic test has been held to 
mean "reasonable person in the intended audience." Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix 
Control Sys., 886 F.2d 1173, ll76 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989); Aliotti v. R. Dakin &: Co., 831 
F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987); Sid &: Marty Krom Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's 
Corp., 562 F.2d ll57 (9th Cir. 1977). 
However, it has been suggested that the courts, by attempting to apply to copy-
right law the 'reasonable person' doctrine as found in other areas of the law, have for-
gotten that all other areas put the trier of fact in the defendants shoes, not as an 
observer, and as such the ·ordinary observer" test is of questionable use. See NIMMER, 
3 THE LAw OF COPYRIGHT, § 13.03 [E][2] (1991). 
92. Sid &: Marty Krom Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 
ll64 (9th Cir. 1977) (under the ·intrinsic test, analytical dissection and expert tes-
timony are not appropriate"). 
This "extrinsic/intrinsic" dichotomy has been uniformly applied in computer 
program infringement cases in the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction. See Johnson Controls, 
Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., 886 F.2d ll73, ll76 (9th Cir. 1989) (to show a program 
is substantially similar, a plaintiff "must demonstrate substantial similarity in both 
idea and expression"); Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., No. C88-20352 RPA 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 1989) (1989 WESTLAW 200350, 2, Allfeds directory) (substantial 
similarity is established by first applying an "extrinsic" test to determine whether two 
ideas are similar. This is an objective test which rests upon specific criteria which can 
be listed and analyzed. Ifthe ideas are similar, the expression of the idea is compared 
under an intrinsic, subjective test which depends on the response of the ordinary rea-
sonable person). However, cf. Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 
F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (disapproving of Krofft, but ultimately admitting 
being bound to follow the Ninth Circuit's ·clearly marked" path of Krofft). 
93. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987). 
94. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986). 
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screen for asynchroneous data communications systems96 
against a corporation marketing and distributing an alleged-
ly infringing "clone" program." Citing Krofft,97 the Softklone 
court weighed the evidence98 and found that substantial sim-
ilarity existed between the ideas behind the two screens (the 
"extrinsic" test) and between the expression of the two screens 
(the "intrinsic" test).99 
In Broderbund,IOO the liability portion of an audiovisual 
"screen" copyright infringement claim was tried. lol Broderbund 
was the exclusive licensee of a copyrighted computer software 
printing program called "The Print Shop" which enables its user 
to create customized greeting cards, signs, banners and posters, 
albeit only on Apple Computer, Inc. computers. l02 Defendant 
Unison World, without authorization, adapted and marketed 
a version of plaintiffs' "Print Shop" program for use on IBM 
compatible computers. 
On the issue of substantial similarity, the Broderbund 
court cited Arnstein 103 as the "leading case in this area ... 
establishing a two-step test for determining substantial sim-
ilarity ... " but followed Krofft, 104 describing Krofft as a decision 
which adopted "albeit with some modification" the Arnstein 
test.l06 Applying the "extrinsic" test, the Broderbund court 
readily determined that "there is no question but that [the two 
95. Plaintiff Digital Communications Associates, Inc. purchased the original plain-
tiff corporation which actually owned and registered the "Crosstalk System" copyright. 
96. Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. 
Supp. 449, 452-53 (N.D. Ga. 1987). Softklone Distributing Corporation was a wholly 
owned subsidiary of ForeTec Development Corporation, and was created for the pur-
pose of marketing and distributing "clone" product such as the "Mirror" program at 
issue. [d. 
97. Sid & Marty Krom Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 
(9th Cir. 1977). 
98. The primary evidence provided by both parties were hard copies of the com- . 
puter program status screen utilized by each program. Digital Comms. Assocs. v. 
Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 453 (N.D. Ga. 1987). 
99. [d. at 465. The court held that the Mirror status screen captured the "total 
concept and feel" of the Crosstalk status screen, and that placement of the screens side-
by-side "clearly points up the substantial similarities between the two display 
screens." [d. 
100. Broderbund Software, Inc. v Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. 
Cal. 1986). 
101. [d. at 1129. 
102. [d. at 1130. 
103. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
104. The Broderbund court weighed heavily the possibility of adopting the newly 
emerging "integrated" approach. See infra notes 124 and 126 and accompanying text. 
105. Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 
(N.D. Cal. 1986). 
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works] share the same underlying idea."l06 Regarding the second 
"intrinsic" branch, the court stated that the test was whether an 
ordinary reasonable person would find the total concept and feel 
of the expression of the subject works to be substantially similar.107 
Applying this test, the Broderbund court found that "[t]he ordi-
nary observer could hardly avoid being struck by the eerie resem-
blance between the screens of the two programs"l08 which "compels 
the finding that their expression is substantially similar. "l09 
The apparent distinctions between the Arnstein and Krafft 
approaches are illusory upon close inspection. Both approach-
es are not so much inconsistent as they are uniquely stated 
and often loosely applied. Regardless of the titles of each "part" 
or "step" in the analysis, the effect of each test is the same; expert 
opinion testimony regarding similarity of ideas is admissible and, 
most notably, can be used by a judge as a matter oflaw to grant 
summary judgement before the trier of fact has an opportunity 
to evaluate any si~ilarities between the works themselves. no 
C. THE "INTEGRATED" TEST 
The third111 concurrent test for substantial similarity in 
computer copyright cases was established by the Third Circuit 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at ll37. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. The court thoroughly discussed the similarities between the "sequence" 
of the screen, and concluded that "[o]ther similarities are too numerous to list. Mere 
lists of similarities cannot adequately convey the expression of overall similarity 
between [the two programs]. No ordinary observer could reasonably conclude that the 
expression of the ideas underlying these two programs were not substantially simi· 
lar. Put simply, "Printmaster" looks like a copy of "Print Shop" with a few embel· 
lishments scattered about in no particular order. The 'total concept and feel' of theses 
programs [citation] is virtually identical." Id. 
llO. For a thorough discussion oUhe interplay between the bifurcated approach 
and the summary judgment standard, see Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1359 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (holding that "satisfaction of the extrinsic test creates a triable issue of fact 
... making it improper for a court to find no substantial similarity as a matter oflaw"). 
However, "[t]his is not to say that summary judgement on the issue of expression is never 
proper." Id. at 1361 n.2 (citing See v. Durang, 7ll F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983). 
lll. A fourth approach, an "iterative" test, has been suggested by one com· 
mentator but has yet to be adopted by any court. See Note, Copyright Infringement of 
Computer Programs: A Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. 
REV. 1264, 1294·1302 (1984). The author suggested a more "objective" approach, free 
from the ordinary observer test completely, allowing expert opinion and focusing on 
whether an alleged infringer literally reproduced a significant portion of the copy· 
righted work, is a better alternative. While allowing reverse engineering and "second 
sourcing" in many cases, the "iterative" approach, it was suggested, "provides a 
clearer standard to judge infringement of copyrighted computer programs, and fur· 
thers the policies of copyright law by promoting dissemination of ideas resulting in 
more cumulative innovation." Id. at 1302. 
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in Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. 112 In that 
case, Whelan Associates113 was hired to design a computer 
program to aid the administration of Jaslow Laboratory, Inc.'s 
(hereinafter "Jaslow") dental prosthetics laboratories.114After 
the program was developed and in use, the parties' business 
relationship worked successfully for two years. 116 Subsequently, 
Jaslow began to develop a program that would serve essentially 
the same function but written in a more marketable comput-
er language. liS Whelan Associates brought an infringement 
action against J aslow after the new J aslow program was 
placed on the market. 117 
The Whelan court opined that the "ordinary observer" test, 
whether standing alone or as the second "intrinsic" step of the 
bifurcated test,1I8 was of doubtful value in cases involving computer 
programs on account of a programs' complexity and its unfamil-
iarity to most members of the public.1I9 Further, the Whelan court 
observed the value of a bifurcated approach is also doubtful when 
the finder of fact is the same person for each step. 120 Abandoning 
completely the use of the dated lay observer test in any part of the 
substantial similarity analysis,121 the Whelan court stated: 
112. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). 
113. The principal of Whelan Associates was originally a principal of the com-
pany with which Jaslow made the development contract. However, "presumably with 
an eye towards exploiting the economic potential of the [newly-developed program], 
she left to form her business and purchased the rights to the program from her for-
mer company." [d. at 1225-26. 
114. [d. at 1225. The agreement, while not a signed writing, was implied by conduct, 
and provided that Whelan Associates retain all ownership rights in the software devel-
oped, with a ten percent royalty going to Jaslow for each system sold. [d. at 1225 n.2. 
115. [d. 
116. [d. at 1226. Since Whelan Associate's program was written in EDL language, 
it could not be used many smaller dental labs, so Jaslow began to re-write the program 
in BASIC. [d. 
117. [d. at 1226-27. 
118 .. The bifurcated Arnstein test was expressly adopted by the Third Circuit in 
Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
423 U.S, 863, 96 S. Ct. 122 (1975). 
119. [d. at 1232. The complexity and unfamiliarity of a program and its technology 
to most members of the public discussed here directly bears on those members of the 
public who might become jurors. 
120. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3rd 
Cir. 1986). Further describing that concern, Judge Becker said, "that person has been 
exposed to expert evidence in the first step, yet she or he is supposed to ignore or 'forget' 
that evidence in analyzing the problem under the second step. Especially in complex cases, 
we doubt that 'forgetting' can be effective when the expert testimony is essential to even 
the most fundamental understanding of the objects in question." [d at 1232-33. 
121. In support of this action, the Whelan court pointed to its decision in 
Williams Elecs. v. Arctic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876 n.6 (3d Cir. 1982) where the court 
found substantial similarity concerning computer programs without mentioning the 
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Op. account of these problems with the stan-
dard, we believe that the ordinary observer 
test is not useful and is potentially mis-
leading when the subjects of the copyright 
are particularly complex, such as computer 
programs. We therefore join the growing 
number of courts which do not apply the 
ordinary observer test in copyright cases 
involving exceptionally difficult materials, 
like computer programs, but instead adopt 
a single substantial similarity inquiry 
according to which both lay and expert tes-
timony would be admissible. 122 
This "integrated" substantial similarity approach, while 
seeming to be the most realistic and practical about the true 
complexity of computer-related copyright cases and the inher-
ent human limitations of ordinary triers of fact, has yet to be 
expressly followed by an appellate court. 123 However, one Ninth 
Circuit district court expressed an eagerness to adopt the 
Whelan approach as "the wave of the future,124" but admitted 
it was bound by the stare decisis effect of Krofft126 to not do SO.126 
v. CONCLUSION 
Since the test for substantial similarity is often dispositive in 
computer program infringement cases,127 consistent expression 
Arnstein test. As the Whelan court stated. "Williams did not explain why it did not use 
the bifurcated Arnstein approach, nor did it distinguish [the 1975 Third Circuit case 
that adopted Arnstein]. To the extent Williams did these things sub silentio, our 
holding today is merely a ratification of Williams on this point." Whelan Assocs. v. 
Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233 n.24 (3d Cir. 1986). 
122. [d. at 1233 (emphasis added). 
123. The court in Whelan cited the following cases as the "modern trend" of courts 
adopting the integrated approach. See E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F. Supp. 
1485, 1493 (D.Minn. 1985); Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 
2 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 25,529 (D.Id 1983) (enunciating a bifurcated test, but rely-
ing entirely on expert testimony); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 752-
3 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (relying entirely on expert testimony to find substantial similarity). 
Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3rd Cir. 1986). 
124. Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 
(N.D. Cal. 1986). 
125. Sid & Marty Krom Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 
(9th Cir. 1977). 
126. See Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 
(N.D. Cal. 1986). "Although this Court is of the opinion that an integrated test involv-
ing expert testimony and analytical dissection may well be the wave of the future in 
this area, the Ninth Circuit's position is clearly marked out in Krofft, and controls the 
analysis herein." [d. 
127. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss2/9
1992] COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 453 
and application of one uniform approach must be had if we wish 
to stabilize the unpredictable state of the law as it currently exists 
in this area. 128 The mere fact that three distinct tests for sub-
stantial similarity have emerged may be indicative of a greater 
problem: modern "high-tech" subject matter may have outgrown 
the bounds of current copyright law.129 The resolve of modern 
courts to adhere to the existing scheme with only occasional 
substantive modification is laudable. However, judges should not 
be forced to resort to judicial legislation and doctrinal slieght of 
hand to reach just decisions in this area. The time has come for 
forthright legislative reconsideration of how we protect com-
puter technology. 130 
In the interim, this Note concludes that the integrated 
test, as established in Whelan,131 is the sounder, more practi-
cal approach in light of the technical, multifarious nature of 
computer-related cases. By allowing the factfinder to hear all 
relevant evidence on the subject matter,132 the integrated 
approach is realistic about the tremendous undertaking 
required to understand the facts and issues of a complicated 
case in order to reach a fair, reasoned and responsible decision. 
Timothy C. Smith * 
128. This is true regardless of which of the approaches is chosen, or if a new 
approach is created and uniformly followed. 
129. See Note, Copyrighting -Look and Feel": Manufacturers Technologies v. Cams, 
3 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 195 (1991). "As the courts have become more experienced in this 
area of intellectual property law, their decisions have become increasingly sophisticat-
ed. At the same time, their decisions have become increasingly contorted as they attempt 
to manipulate an existing statutory framework that is unsuited to the field." Id. at 204. 
130. Good arguments have been made for the protection of such works under 
patent law, see generally Lundberg, Michel & Smuner, The Copyright / Patent Interface: 
Why Utilitarian -Look and Feel" is Uncopyrightable Subject Matter, COMPUTER LAW., 
Jan. 1989, at 5, or trade dress, see generally Beutel, Trade Dress Protection for the Look 
and Feel" of Software: A New Source of Proprietary Rights Protection for the Software 
Industry?, COMPUTER LAw., Oct. 1988, at 1,2. 
At least one Commentator has suggested giving computer technology its own fed-
eral statutory protection scheme. See Note, Copyrighting -Look and Feel": 
Manufacturers Technologies v. Cams, 3 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 195 (1991). The author con-
cluded that "Computers and software provide a mixture of traditional intellectual prop-
erty areas and special problems relating to creation, copying, and reverse engineering 
not found elsewhere. By devising a separate category of federal protection for computers 
and computer programs, much of the uncertainty which results from manipulation of 
general principles could be eliminated. In this way, the progress of the useful art of 
science and computer programming would truly be promoted." Id. at 204. 
131. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 
1986). 
132. Particularly since testimony by experts is urged in Federal courts "[i]f sci-
entific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier offact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue ... " Fed. R. Evid. 702 (West 1990). 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993. 
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